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The First Amendment, Compelled Speech & Minors:
Jettisoning the FCC Mandate for
Children's Television Programming
Clay Calvert'
ABSTRACT
This article examines whether the Federal Communications Commission should
abandon its mandate that broadcasters air three hours per week of regularly
scheduled television content serving the needs of minors. This 1996 obligation was
adopted against the backdrop of a very different media landscape and in response
to the Children's Television Act of 1990. The article traces the rule's origins,
including the FCC's public-interest authority undergirding it. It also analyzes the
2018 call by FCC Commissioner Michael O'Rielly for scrapping the three-hour
rule, as well as competing arguments for maintaining it. Furthermore, the article
delves into: 1) the First Amendment's general animosity toward compelled-speech
regulations; 2) the FCC's ability to impose compelled-speech directives on
over-the-air broadcasters; and 3) the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements
for abolishing the three-hour ule. The article concludes that while public pressure
to retain the rule will be immense in the name of helping children, its demise is
both warranted and inevitable.
' Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B.
Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987,
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of
California and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.
35
36 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL Vol. 107
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.........................................................35
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................36
INTRODUCTION.....................................................37
I. PUBLIC INTEREST, COMPELLED SPEECH AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: AN OvERvIEw............................42
A. The FCC and the Public Interest........................42
B. Compelled Speech, Broadcasting & Content-Based Regulations.......... 44
C. The Administrative Procedure Act............... ............ 49
II. THE THREE-HOUR, CORE-PROGRAMMING MANDATE:
EXAMINING ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ITS CONTINUATION ...............52
CONCLUSION... .......................................................... 57
2018-2019 THE FIRST AMENDMENT, COMPELLED SPEECH & MINORS
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution' protects not only the
right to speak, but also an unenumerated right not to be compelled by the
government to speak.2 The latter was established by the United States Supreme
Court seventy-five years ago in the flag-salute case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.
The Court since has observed that "the right of freedom of thought protected by
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all." 4 More recently, Justice David Souter
noted in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association that the "government may not
force individuals to utter or convey messages they disagree with or, indeed, to say
anything at all."' In brief, "[t]he right not to speak may be thought of in terms of a
right to be free from government-compelled speech. . . ."6
The implied right not to speak, however, is far from absolute. That is especially
true for over-the-air broadcasters who, as the U.S. Supreme Court has observed,
receive "the most limited First Amendment protection."' That point was pounded
home nearly a half-century ago by the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission. 8 The Court there upheld the
compelled-speech mandates of the Fairness Doctrine, 9 along with its personal
I The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. 1. The Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities
and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (noting
that "one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may
also decide 'what not to say"') (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cll. L.
REv. 195, 205 (1992) (observing that "current constitutional interpretation finds the right not to speak
implied by the right of free speech").
3 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also Joseph Blocher, Rights to and Not to, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761,
763 (2012) (noting that "West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette established a First
Amendment right not to speak .... ).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 573 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court
reinforced the general principle that compelled expression raises First Amendment concerns in 2018 in
the case of Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018). Justice Samuel Alito explained for the five-justice majority in Janus that "most of our free
speech cases have involved restrictions on what can be said, rather than laws compelling speech. But
measures compelling speech are at least as threatening." Id at 2464.
' Clay Calvert, Freedom ofSpeech & the High Price ofCollege Textbooks: Do New Laws Affecting
Disclosure of Textbook Information Go Too Far and Violate the First Amendment?, 2008 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 637, 653 (2008).
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
8 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
9 The Faimess Doctrine "imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that
discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be
given fair coverage." Id. at 369.
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attack"o and political editorial components." In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has authority to
adopt rules serving the public interest'2 and that, when it comes to broadcast
content, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.""
The Red Lion Court thus opined that conditioning a broadcaster's license "on a
willingness to present representative community views on controversial issues is
consistent with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding
the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press."'" It added that it
was not:
[Tnconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a
broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course
of discussing controversial issues, or to require that the political
opponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to
communicate with the public.'I
Much has changed since Red Lion was handed down in 1969. The Fairness
Doctrine, for example, has not been enforced for three decades.'" Furthermore, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2000 ordered the FCC to
"immediately [] repeal the personal attack and political editorial rules."" Yet the
FCC continues to compel over-the-air broadcasters to carry another category of
content: programming for children.'I
10 This provision provided that "[wihen a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a
public issue ... the individual attacked himself [must] be offered an opportunity to respond." Id at 378.
" This provision provided that "where one candidate is endorsed in a political editorial, the other
candidates must themselves be offered reply time to use personally or through a spokesman." Id
1 Id at 379; see 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (vesting the FCC with authority to adopt regulations "from
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires").
" Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
141d at 394.
" Id at 392.
I tn 1987, the FCC issued an order refusing to enforce the Fairness Doctrine and holding that "the
fairness doctrine contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the public interest." Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 FCC Red. 5043, 5057 (1987). In 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld that change in policy, reasoning "that the FCC's decision that the fairness doctrine no
longer served the public interest was neither arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion." Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The next year, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to hear the case. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (denying cert.). For
further discussion of the FCC's change in policy regarding the Fairness Doctrine, see Andrew V.
Moshirnia & Aaron T. Dozeman, In All Fairness: Using Political Broadcast Access Doctrine to Tailor
Public Campaign Fund Matching, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 641, 686 (2015) ("During the mid-1980's,
a period of hyper-deregulation, the FCC abandoned the Fairness Doctrine."), and Christopher S. Yoo,
The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Speci/ic Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245,
264 (2003) (describing "the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine").
" Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
1 See Children's Educational Television, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/childrens-educational-television [https://perma~cclN98L-YXEE].
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More specifically, television broadcasters generally must air at least three hours
per week of "core programming"l9 that serves "the educational and informational
needs of children ages 16 and under."2 o Educational and informational needs, in
turn, encompass either "intellectual/cognitive or social/emotional"
2 1 ones. Core
programs satisfying these needs must be "regularly scheduled,"
2 2 a minimum of
thirty minutes long,23 carried "between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.[j"
2 4
and identified on the TV screen throughout a show with an "E/I" symbol.
2 5
Non-core programs, however, may count toward the three-hour requirement in
some situations.26 The FCC embraced these rules in an August 1996 order
27
following adoption of the Children's Television Act of 199028 (CTA) and under
pressure from President Bill Clinton, FCC chairman Reed Hundt,
29 and Congress.30
These core programming requirements have been controversial since their
inception. That's partly because, as one author notes, they seem "to contradict the
principle that government cannot tell the media what to say."
3 ' Indeed, the three-
19 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(c) (2018).
20 Id. § 73.671(c)(1).
21 Id. § 73.671(c).
22
1Id. § 73.671(c)(3).
23 Id. § 73.671(c)(4).
24 Id § 73.671(c)(2).
25 Id. § 73.671(c)(5).
26 Specifically, the FCC allows a broadcast licensee to satisfy the children's programming mandate if
it has aired a package of different types of educational and informational programming
that, while containing somewhat less than three hours per week of Core Programming,
demonstrates a level of commitment to educating and informing children that is at least
equivalent to airing three hours per week of Core Programming. In this regard, specials,
PSAs [public service announcements], short-form programs, and regularly scheduled non-
weekly programs with a significant purpose of educating and informing children can count
toward the three hour per week processing guideline.
Id. § 73.671(e)(1).
" Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, 11 FCC Red. 10660 (1996).
28 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a) (2012) (providing, in pertinent part, that the FCC "shall, in its review of any
application for renewal of a commercial or noncommercial television broadcast license, consider the
extent to which the licensee ... has served the educational and informational needs of children through
the licensee's overall programming, including programming specifically designed to serve such needs").
29 See Richard Cortez Jr., Comment, Welcome to the 21st Century Classroom - Your Living Room:
The FCC Requires Three Hours of Children's Educational and Informational Programming, 51 SMU L.
REv. 413, 419-20 (1998) ("Reed Hundt, the FCC Chairman appointed by President Clinton in 1993,
planned on using his position to 'goad broadcasters into improving TV.' Hundt specifically wanted to
give the CTA [Children's Television Act] some muscle in the hopes that the educational and
informational needs of children would be quantifiably served.") (internal citations omitted).
o Lili Levi, A "Pay or Play" Experiment to Improve Children's Educational Television, 62 FED.
COMM. L.J. 275, 291 (2010) (noting that "Congress and the White House pressured the FCC to quantify
children's educational programming requirements," and adding that the rules "were finally generated as
a result of last-minute negotiations between industry leaders and the White House immediately prior to a
scheduled White House summit on children's television policy.").
" Brittney Pescatore, Note, Time to Change the Channel: Assessing the FCC's Children's
Programming Requirements under the First Amendment, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 81, 82 (2009).
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hour FCC mandate came only after "a titanic struggle."32 Broadcasters viewed such
three-hour "quantification as anathema, an intrusive government edict intolerable
under the First Amendment." " Although they bristled against the rules, 34
broadcasters agreed not to challenge their constitutionality as part of a "1996
compromise brokered by the White House in connection with a children's
television summit convened by President Clinton.""
More than two decades and a half-dozen FCC chairs later, 6 broadcasters may
finally obtain the relief they long have sought - and without having to go to court,
no less. That's because in February 2018, current FCC Chairman Ajit Pai tasked
the Commission with reviewing the core programming rules and put fellow
Republican Commissioner Michael O'Rielly" in charge of the process." That
development was unsurprising. In January 2018, O'Rielly had blogged that "the
Commission needs to reconsider the ineffective and burdensome requirements
currently imposed on our nation's broadcasters to air a certain amount of
educational and informational children's programming on a weekly basis,
colloquially referred to as Kid Vid." 39
The possibility of abandoning the three-hour programming rule follows
naturally in the deregulatory footsteps of the Pai-led, Republican-majority FCC's
vote along party lines' in December 2017 to repeal network neutrality rules
3 2 James J. Popham, Passion, Politics and the Public Interest: The Perilous Path to a Quantitative
Standard in the Regulation of Children's Television Programming, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS J.
COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1997).
33 Id.
" Reed Hundt, the FCC chairman under whose leadership the three-hour requirement was adopted,
observed that the three-hour minimum was "fiercely opposed by broadcasters." Reed E. Hundt, The
Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J.
1089, 1111 (1996).
" Lili Levi, The FCC's Affirmative Speech Obligations Promoting Child Welfare, 22 REGENT U. L.
REv. 323, 326 (2010).
3 Subsequent to Reed Hundt's tenure chairing the FCC, the position has been held on a fulitime
basis by William Kennard, Michael Powell, Kevin Martin, Julius Genachowski, Tom Wheeler and,
currently, Ajit Pai. Commissioners from 1934 to Present, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https-//www.fcc.gov/general/commissioners-1934-present [https://perma.cc/9T2V-JYN2] (last updated
June 7, 2018). In addition, both Michael J. Copps and Mignon Clyborn served as acting chairs
subsequent Hundt's departure in November 1997. Id.7 See Jim Puzzanghera, Rules Eased for Big TV, Telecom Companies, BALT. SUN, Apr. 23, 2017,
at A12 (noting that both Pai and O'Rielly are Republicans).
3 See Press Release, Michael O'Rielly, FCC Commissioner, Statement of Commissioner Michael
O'Rielly on Next Steps for Reviewing the Commission's Kid Vid Rules (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-349167Al.pdf [https://perma-cc/XJ54-A3XU]
(Chairman Pai has asked me to lead the agency's review of the stringent requirements the FCC imposes
on our nation's broadcasters to air a certain amount of educational and informational children's
programming on a weekly basis, otherwise known as Kid Vid.").
3 Michael O'Rielly, It's Time to Reexamine the FCC's Kid Vid Requirements, FED. COMM.
CoMMusSION BLOG (Jan. 26, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2018/01/26/its-
time-reexamine-fccs-kid-vid-requirements [https://permacc/3JNY-RUHL].
4 See Brian Fung, Split FCC Votes to End Rules on Net Neutrality, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2017, at
Al (describing "[t]he 3-to-2 vote along party lines" by the FCC "to repeal the government's 2015 net
neutrality rules, which required Internet providers to treat all websites, large and small, equally").
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adopted when Democrats held a majority on the Commission.4 1 Under Pai's
leadership, in fact, the FCC has abandoned several rules affecting broadcasters in a
wave of deregulatory initiatives.4 2
The children's programming issue is important partly because the FCC
continues to vigorously enforce the three-hour mandate and its related rules, as well
as to review-four times each year, in fact- whether broadcasters comply with
it.43 For instance, Beach TV Properties and Beach TV of South Carolina -owners
of television stations in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina--paid $90,000 in
2015 to resolve a dispute over its compliance with the children's core programming
rules." The FCC contended that Beach TV had not complied with the rules because
it counted repeats of single-episode specials such as Sharks and Wildlife and
Lagoons, Bayous & Storms toward the three-hour mandate.45 More recently in
August 2017, the FCC issued a consent decree in which Mountain Broadcasting
Corporation agreed to pay $17,500 after a New Jersey television station it owned
failed to display the "E/1" symbol on certain children's core programming."
This article examines whether the FCC should jettison its three-hour children's
programming mandate. Part I provides brief primers on three foundational topics
for better evaluating this issue: 1) the contested nature of the FCC's public interest
authority; 2) the Supreme Court's general hostility to compelled-speech
requirements; and 3) the FCC's obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act
when the Commission seeks to change its rules. Next, Part II considers the
arguments both for and against retaining the three-hour obligation, contextualizing
them within both the contentious history behind the measure, and recent Supreme
Court rulings. Finally, Part III concludes that FCC regulations should match the
realities of the modem media marketplace and media consumption trends. The
three-hour obligation for core children's programming, in turn, is a relic from a
bygone era and ultimately will be abandoned by the current Republican-majority
FCC.
" Jim Puzzanghera, The FCC Votes to End Internet Rules; Repeal of Provisions Aimed at Ensuring
Uninhibited Flow of Data Online is Win for Telecom Firms, GOP, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2017, at Al.
4 2 See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. to Lift Rules Limiting Media Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,2017, at B6
(describing "Pai's fervor for deregulation of the media industry," and noting Pai's efforts "to roll back
rules that prevent ownership of a newspaper and broadcast station in the same market").
" See David Oxenford & David O'Connor, A Broadcaster's Guide to Washington Issues, TV
NEWS CHECK (Jan. 15, 2018, 5:45 AM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/110351/a-broadcasters-
guide-to-washington-issues [https://perma.cc/49Y9-STEQ]. The FCC requires that commercial
television broadcasters "report their children's educational and informational broadcast programming
efforts to the FCC by electronically filing FCC Form 398, Children's Television Programming Report,
each quarter." Children's Educational Television Reporting - Form 398, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/media/television/childrens-educational-television-reporting-form-
39 8
[https://permaccrT4BG-VQNV].
" Beach TV Props., Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 7674, 7676 (2015).
45 Id. at 7675.
* Mountain Broad. Corp., 32 FCC Rcd. 5656, 5658-59, 5661 (2017).
41
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
I. PUBLIC INTEREST, COMPELLED SPEECH AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: AN OVERVIEW
This Part has three sections. First, Section A addresses the FCC's public
interest mandate. Next, Section B briefly reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's general
opposition to compelled-speech obligations, as well as the strict scrutiny standard
by which the constitutionality of most content-based regulations of speech are
measured. Finally, Section C covers key provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) affecting decisions by the FCC and other federal agencies to
change rules.
A. The FCC and the Public Interest
When it comes to the FCC's authority over television broadcasters, perhaps no
concept is more important-and more contested-than public interest. 4 7 For
instance, in considering whether to award a broadcast license, the FCC is statutorily
obligated to determine "whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will
be served by the granting of such application."4 8 Similarly, "a renewal of such
license may be granted . . . if the Commission finds that public interest,
convenience, and necessity would be served thereby."4 9 And most significantly for
purposes of this article, the FCC is vested with statutory authority to adopt rules
"from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires."o In
brief, broadcasters are granted licenses to use scarce broadcast frequencies and, in
exchange, must act as public trustees and serve the public interest."
Precisely just what constitutes the public interest, however, is highly disputed.
Indeed, as attorney Daniel Patrick Graham notes, "[c]ourts, commissioners, and
commentators have adopted various definitions of 'public interest' over the
4 See Victoria F. Phillips, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Angels Earning Wings,
53 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 619 (2004) ("For nearly seventy-five years, this public interest standard has
guided American broadcast regulatory policy, and, along with competition, the goals of localism and
diversity have long formed its foundation.").
* 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2012).
49 Id. § 307(c)(1).
5 Id. § 303.
s' Gigi Sohn, former head of Public Knowledge, tidily encapsulates this model below:
The FCC was charged with managing the airwaves in a fashion consistent with the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity"-the public trustee doctrine. The public trustee
doctrine grew up around this statutory public interest obligation: the FCC gave large,
exclusive grants of spectrum to individual broadcasters who remained private entities. The
spectrum was large enough to guarantee that even the primitive broadcasting technology of
the 1930's would function without interference- In exchange for free, exclusive grants of
public spectrum, broadcasters agreed to act as "public trustees" of the airwaves. As public
trustees, broadcasters were to use their free spectrum to provide certain public interest
programming, including coverage of local issues and public affairs, coverage of differing
viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance, children's educational and
informational programming, and general promotion [sic] political discourse.
Gigi Sohn, The Gore Commission Ten Years Later: Reimagining the Public Interest Standard in an
Era of Spectrum Abundance, 17 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 657, 662 (2009)
(internal citations omitted).
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years."5 2 Attorneys Erwin Krasnow and Jack Goodman go so far as to assert that
"[p]erhaps no single area of communications policy has generated as much
scholarly discourse, judicial analysis, and political debate over the course of the last
seventy years as has that simple directive to regulate in the 'public interest.""'
A complete analysis of the public interest standard is beyond the scope of this
article, which concentrates instead on whether the three-hour mandate for
children's programming should be scrapped. For purposes here, it suffices to say
that:
[T]he dispute over the meaning of this crucial concept can be
reduced to a dialectic: Is the public interest whatever the public is
interested in watching, as determined by marketplace forces such as
audience size and demographics, or is the public interest whatever the
public needs to watch, as determined by government agencies and
politicians?54
This wants-versus-needs friction 5 on the meaning of public interest has shifted
over time. Most relevant for this article, the 1980s witnessed what Professor Cass
Sunstein calls "a period of significant deregulation" in which "many of the more
particular public interest requirements were removed." 56 That shift wasn't
surprising because Mark Fowler, the former FCC chairman appointed by President
Ronald Reagan, often advocated that "the public interest is what interests the
public."" The Children's Television Act of 1990, however, stands out in high relief
as an exception to this deregulatory trend.5 1
It was Reed Hundt, President Bill Clinton's 1993 appointee as FCC chairman,59
who both railed against deregulatory evisceration of the public interest and who
fiercely argued that the three-hour mandate for core children's programming was
52 Daniel Patrick Graham, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital Age, 11 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 97, 105 (2003).
" Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard: The Search for the
Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1998).
5 CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE
109-10 (2000).
s See id. at 110 (asserting that the dispute over the meaning of public interest "boils down to a
wants versus needs contest").
' Cass R Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 499, 507 (2000).
5 Michael A. McGregor, When the "Public Interest" Is Not What Interests the Public, 11 COMM.
L. & POL'Y 207, 224 (2006) (paraphrasing Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 210 (1982)).
* As one article explains it:
The FCC has effectively deregulated broadcasting. Indeed, with one exception, the
Children's Television Act of 1990 ("CTA'", the FCC receives no programming information
from which it might assess the public service efforts of its licensees, nor does it monitor the
industry generally or through specific random inspections that evaluate public service efforts.
Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
341, 344 (1998).
9 See Biography of Reed Hundt, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/biography-reed-
hundt [https://perma.cc/EM4M-B92L] ("Reed Hundt was named Chairman of the FCC by President
Clinton and was swom in by Vice President Gore on November 29, 1993.").
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compelled by it. Writing in 1996, Hundt argued that: "In the past fifteen years, the
FCC has gotten dangerously out of step with the wishes of the public and the
Congress on these issues. The FCC essentially dismantled the public interest
standard in the early 1980s by conflating the 'public interest' with anything
sponsors will support."6
In contrast, a three-hour obligation for children's programming, Hundt averred,
was "consistent with the public interest in the education and development of the
nation's children, and the related interest in the development of an educated and
motivated electorate."' Additionally, Hundt contended that the need for a clear
requirement for children's programming was essential because:
The cost of a vague or clandestine implementation of the public
interest standard can be frighteningly high. Imagine a broadcast licensee
whose renewal is denied because it has not aired enough educational
children's programming. Without an explicit, public standard, the
licensee is left to wonder whether the Commission denied the renewal
for some other eason, such as in retaliation for an anti-government slant
in the station's news broadcasts.62
In brief, the FCC's three-hour core programming mandate is inextricably
linked to the Commission's public interest power. The obligation was adopted to
serve the public interest.63 As Hundt put it immediately after the FCC embraced the
requirement, "[e]ven though the marketplace provides many television shows that
interest the public, the public interest requires asking broadcasters to take steps that
do not necessarily maximize profits but that further the different and all-important
purpose of helping educate the next generation.""
B. Compelled Speech, Broadcasting & Content-Based Regulations
If the public interest concept provides the FCC with an entry point for
regulating the content that broadcasters air, then the First Amendment gives
broadcasters constitutional ammunition for pushing back against such regulations.
Reconciling the public interest mandate imposed on broadcasters with their First
Amendment speech rights is far from easy. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed
forty-five years ago, "[b]alancing the various First Amendment interests involved
in the broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's right to be
informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty." 65
' Hundt, supra note 34, at 1094.
61 Id. at 1100.
62 1d at 1113.
63 Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53
FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 429 (2001) (noting that "in the name of the public interest, the FCC, at various
times, has required or 'encouraged' broadcasters to air particular types of programming, such as political
broadcasts and editorials, news and weather reports, and children's programming") (emphasis added).
* Press Release, Reed E. Hundt, FCC Chairman, Statement of Chairman Reed E. Hundt
on Adoption of Children's Educational Television Order (Aug. 8, 1996),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/kidvid.html [https://perma.cc/M5PQ-CNKJ].
61 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
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A key First Amendment interest at stake when the FCC compels broadcasters to
air content such as children's programming is the implied right not to speak.
Indeed, as Justice Stevens wrote in 1995, "[t]he First Amendment generally
protects the right not to speak as well as the right to speak."' The Court has
observed that "[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of
mind."' 6 7
Under this rationale, the Court has declared a West Virginia law requiring
public high school students to salute the American flag unconstitutional. 68
Similarly, it has held that a New Hampshire court may not require its citizens to
display the state's "Live Free or Die" motto on their license plates.
69 The Court
reasoned there that "where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no
matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message."o
7 Viewed in
this light, "[t]he notion of the government commanding broadcasters to air certain
kinds of programming . . . strongly cuts against the grain of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression."
7
1
Yet the principle against compelled speech varies depending upon the medium
involved. Specifically, the Court in 1974 struck down a Florida right-of-reply
statute that compelled newspapers in the Sunshine State to give-free of
charge-political candidates space to reply to editorial attacks on their personal
character or record.72 The Court there reasoned that:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment
of public issues and public officials- whether fair or unfair-- constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as
they have evolved to this time.7 3
At least when it comes to the print medium, then, "[t]he First Amendment
affords editors and speakers the right not to speak and not to carry or favor
' Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
61 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
6 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.").
69 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
71 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children's
Television Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1196 (1996).
72 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
73 Id.
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unwanted speech of others, at least absent sufficient governmental justification for
infringing on that right."'
The earlier discussion of Red Lion made clear, however, that similar
compelled-speech obligations are permissible in the realm of broadcasting.75 Why?
The Court in Red Lion emphasized that "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."17
One critical difference in the characteristics of broadcasting the Court focused on
was spectrum scarcity-that "there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate."7 7
In brief, what Lee Bollinger calls "the inherent physical limitation on the
number of useable frequencies"7 in the broadcast medium opened the door for
more closely regulating the speech of broadcasters, who act as fiduciaries to serve
the public interest in receiving a range of views and information.79 Put slightly
differently by Jonathan Wallace and Michael Green, "the doctrine of 'spectrum
scarcity' allowed Congress to make rules for broadcast media that would be
unconstitutional if applied to print."so
Thus, rather than focusing only on the First Amendment right of broadcasters to
speak or not to speak, the Red Lion Court concentrated on the right of audience
members to receive speech. It reasoned, for instance, that "[i]t is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial here."8 i It added that "[i]t is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."82
Similarly, the Court noted that "[t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster ... does
not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others."" In a nutshell, the right
of broadcasters not to speak could be abridged in order to give the viewing public
access to receive the speech of others who are not granted licenses.
This logic suggests, of course, that the compelled-speech mandate of airing
three hours of programming per week serving the needs of minors would similarly
be upheld under a Red Lion-like analysis. Here, it would be the right of
" U.S. Telecom Ass'n. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original).
7s See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (addressing Red Lion).
7' Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
7 Id at 388.
7 LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 70 (1991).
7 The Court explained:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one
who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
' Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the Printing Press
and Freedom ofSpeech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 711, 725 (1997).
8' Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
8 Id
8' Id. at 387.
46 Vol. 107
2018-2019 THE FIRST AMENDMENT, COMPELLED SPEECH & MINORS
children-viewers, not the right of broadcasters, that would be paramount so that
children-viewers would have suitable access to educational and informational
content. If, as Thomas Krattenmaker and L. A. Powe, Jr. note, "Red
Lion permits-indeed, virtually exhorts-government to override broadcasters'
programming preferences to effectuate the right of listeners and viewers,"" then a
court today applying this same logic would likely uphold the three-hour core
programming for children obligation.
But the Court's medium-specific analysis-treating regulations of speech in the
print medium different from those imposed on broadcasting"-has been criticized
in the Internet era as "a dated ritual."" As Sean Howell recently wrote, "attempts
to treat particular media differently for First Amendment purposes have become
increasingly problematic as media have converged." " Professor Ronald
Krotoszynski, Jr., presciently suggested in 1996 that, in light of the explosion of the
number of cable channels the development of direct broadcast satellite, and the
accessibility of the Internet, it "makes little sense to continue holding television
broadcasters hostage to some sort of second class status under the First Amendment
on the theory that they hold an effective monopoly on access to the marketplace of
ideas.""
Yet the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts's leadership, as Dean
Lyrissa Lidsky notes, twice dodged "the opportunity to revisit whether broadcasters
receive less First Amendment protection from content-based regulation than other
media."" Instead of jettisoning them, the Court left "intact 'medium-specific' First
Amendment doctrines applicable only to broadcasters."'
For broadcasters, that surely is disappointing. Why? As Professor Hannibal
Travis notes, "[t]here seems to be no limiting principle that would dictate whether
the Court would have to stick to Red Lion's doctrine."9'
" Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1722 (1995).
8 Under this medium-specific perspective, "broadcasting is the least protected, print is the most
secure, and cable is in between." Donald E. Lively, Modern Media and the First Amendment:
Rediscovering Freedom of the Press, 67 WASH. L. REV. 599, 606 (1992).
" Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 1067, 1068 (1994).
8 Sean Howell, Note, A "Hot" and "Cool" First Amendment: Analyzing Speech Effects in a
Shifting Media Environment, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1295 (2016).
* Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 71, at 1205-06.
" Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nota Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1829 (2012).
"'Id. at 1827. The two missed opportunities, in Lidsky's view, involved the Court's review of the
FCC's regulation of broadcast indecency in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) and
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239 (2012). Id. For another article discussing the current
Supreme Court's avoidance of the First Amendment issue as it relates to broadcasters, see William E.
Lee, Books, Video Games, and Foul-Mouthed Hollywood Glitteratae: The Supreme Court and the
Technology-Neutral Interpretation of the First Amendment, 14 COLUM. Sc. & TECH. L. REV. 295,
297-98 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court in Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239, "punted and
avoided the fundamental question of First Amendment technological neutrality" and "postponed for
another day" the issue of "[w]hether full First Amendment protection should be restored to
broadcasting").
" Hannibal Travis, The FCC's New Theory of the First Amendment, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
417,481 (2011).
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One limiting principle would seem to be stare decisis"-"the idea that today's
Court should stand by yesterday's decisions."9 3 This doctrinal barrier, however, is
not impregnable, especially when facts and circumstances change94 or a prior ruling
proves unworkable.95 In other words, developments in communication technologies
and the media landscape in the forty-nine years since Red Lion might be sufficient
to overcome rigid adherence to stare decisis.
Furthermore, the Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission" suggests that broadcasters, as First Amendment speakers, should no
longer be treated differently from others. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony
Kennedy held that "restrictions distinguishing among different speakers" are
prohibited by the First Amendment." He added that "[s]peech restrictions based on
the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content."98
Embracing an overarching principle that speakers should be treated equally,
Kennedy emphasized that "the Government may commit a constitutional wrong
when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers."'
Viewed in this light, broadcasters should not be dealt with by the Court or
administrative agencies as "second-class First Amendment citizens," " akin to
prisoners or public high school students.'o' Compelled-speech obligations foisted
on them because of their identity as broadcasters, such as the three-hour,
core-programming mandate, amount to-borrowing Kennedy's words-"a means to
control content."'02 Cable networks, which are not subject to the same rules, are
treated as what Kennedy would call "preferred speakers."l03 If Citizens United thus
92 See generally Richard M. Garner, Flexible Predictability: Stare Decisis in Ohio, 48 AKRON L.
REv. 15, 15 (2015) (observing that the doctrine of stare decisis "holds that similar cases should be
decided by similar legal principles rather than by the personal views of an ever-changing judiciary");
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2015)
(asserting that the "essence of stare decisis is a preference for keeping faith with the past").
1 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
" See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (observing that competing against the doctrine
of stare decisis is the interest in "recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of
accumulated experience").
9 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015) ("The doctrine of stare decisis allows us
to revisit an earlier decision where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable.").
9 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
97 Id. at 340.
9 Id.
9 Id.
'" Kathleen M. Sullivan, Lecture, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REv. 203, 206 (1994).
"on See Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference and Its Differential
Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13, 54 (2012)
(contending that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in both Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007), and Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006), "the individuals impacted by the bestowal of
deference on, respectively, school officials and prison administrators are, for all intents and purposes,
second-class First Amendment citizens-namely, minors and prisoners"); Clay Calvert & Kara Camley
Murrhee, Big Censorship in the Big House-A Quarter-Century After Turner v. Sa/ley: Muting Movies,
Music & Books Behind Bars, 7 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 257, 264 (2012) (asserting that "both minors on
campus and adults behind bars are treated as second-class citizens" by the U.S. Supreme Court in terms
of First Amendment speech rights).
102 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
103 Id
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stands for a "speaker-neutrality conceptualization" " of the First Amendment
under which the Free Speech Clause "is indifferent to a speaker's identity or
qualities-whether animate or inanimate, corporate or nonprofit, collective or
individual," I then the case opens the door for abolishing the children's
programming rules. The logic of Citizens United, when read broadly, is at
loggerheads with that of Red Lion.
Finally, were the children's core programming rules to be challenged in
court-something, as noted earlier, broadcasters voluntarily agreed not to do when
the obligations were adoptedi6-they would need to pass muster under the strict
scrutiny standard of review because they constitute content-based regulations.
0 7
Under strict scrutiny, the FCC might be able to demonstrate a compelling
government interest in serving the educational and informational needs of
minors.'0 Yet, it would seemingly have a much harder time proving, under the
narrow tailoring facet of strict scrutiny, that the three-hour mandate is "the least
restrictive means"'" of serving that interest. In other words, the government would
need to demonstrate that there are no ways of serving the educational and
informational needs of minors other than by forcing broadcasters to carry three
hours of programming each week.' o A complete discussion of the strict scrutiny
analysis is beyond the scope of this article, which concentrates on the broader issue
of whether or not the rules should be abandoned.
C. The Administrative Procedure Act
If the FCC abolishes its three-hour programming mandate and, in turn, if that
action is challenged in court, the Commission must prove its decision was not
arbitrary and capricious. "' That's because the Administrative Procedure Act
'" Robert L. Kerr, What Justice Powell and Adam Smith Could Have Told the Citizens United
Majority About Other People's Money, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 211, 248 (2011).
105 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Two Concepts ofFreedom ofSpeech, 124 HARV. L. REv. 143,
156(2010).
'0 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
107 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a
content-based speech regulation can only withstand judicial review "if it satisfies strict scrutiny," and
noting that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest," and adding that "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative").
" See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that "content-based
restrictions on speech" are permissible "only if they survive strict scrutiny," and adding that strict
scrutiny requires the government to prove that the regulation in question "furthers a compelling
[governmental] interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest") (emphasis added).
'" McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
"o See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 ("If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's
purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.").
] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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("APA")l 2 "imposes several procedural requirements on the manner in which
administrative agencies may act."" 3
The APA was adopted in 1946 and "established the fundamental relationship
between regulatory agencies and those whom they regulate-between government,
on the one hand, and private citizens, business, and the economy, on the other
hand.""14 Judicial review of agency decisions to determine if they were arbitrary
and capricious "provides a critical check against unconstrained agency power while
still protecting agency expertise and independence from overreaching by the
courts.""'5 At a macro-level of analysis, then, "courts applying the arbitrary and
capricious test review the rationality of agency decisions."1 6
What, however, does this mean as applied at the micro level when an agency
such as the FCC changes an existing policy? Initially, and indicative of deference
toward administrative agencies, the Supreme Court has held that "a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency" in determining if a policy change
was arbitrary and capricious. 117 A court, however, must ensure the agency
"examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.""' As the Supreme Court explained thirty-five years ago:
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should
not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a
reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not
given." 9
In 2016, the Supreme Court encapsulated these principles, holding that
"[a]gencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a
reasoned explanation for the change."1 20 An agency, however, need not prove that
the new policy or decision is "the best one possible or even whether it is better than
the alternatives."'21
112 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559 (2012)).
" Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 95,97 (2003).
"" George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996).
"s Louis J. Virelli 1II, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721, 723
(2014).
116 Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1356
(2016).
" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
".. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
" 9 Id.
12o Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (emphasis added).
121 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016).
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Thus, after the FCC changed its indecency policy to target fleeting
expletives,12 2 the Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations observed that:
[T]he agency must show that there are good reasons for the new
policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there
are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.123
The Court added in Fox Television Stations that an "agency need not always
provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy
created on a blank slate."l2 4 Furthermore, an agency's decision to rescind a policy
such as the three-hour programming mandate is not subject to more searching
review under the APA than the initial decision to adopt that policy. 125 Fox
Television Stations thus has been interpreted by some scholars as making "it easier
for agencies to change their minds,"' 26 partly because "comparative judgments
among reasonable policy choices are not necessary in an agency's explanation for a
change in policy." 127 Significantly, however, five justices-Justice Anthony
Kennedy in a concurring opinion 128 and Justices Stephen Breyer, John Paul
Stevens, David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a dissenting opinionl29-in Fox
Television Stations would also require an agency to explain why it changed a
policy.
The bottom line, then, is that while the FCC may scrap its three-hour
programming mandate, it must demonstrate a "minimal level of analysis"'
3 0 that
evidences "a reasoned explanation for the change""' and "good reasons for the
new policy."' 3 2 Yet, as Professor Steve Johnson recently pointed out: "[T]here is no
'" See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Institutionalized Word Taboo: The Continuing Saga of
FCC Indecency Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 567, 586-603 (2013) (examining the FCC's shift
in its indecency policy to target fleeting expletives and the judicial rulings spawned by this change).
'" FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis added to the words
"good reasons for the new policy" and "good reasons").
124 id.
125 See id (noting that the APA "makes no distinction . . . between initial agency action and
subsequent agency action undoing or revising that action").
126 Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 113 (2018).
"John B. Meisel, How Might the Supreme Court, if it Reviews the Federal Communications
Commission's 2015 Open Internet Order, Utilize the Chevron and the Arbitrary and Capricious Tests?,
25 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 257, 268 (2017).
128 See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I agree with the
dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer that the agency must explain why 'it now reject[s] the
considerations that led it to adopt that initial policy."').
21 See id at 546-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In my view, the Federal Communications
Commission failed adequately to explain why it changed its indecency policy from a policy permitting
a single 'fleeting use' of an expletive, to a policy that made no such exception." (emphasis in original)).
" Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117,2125 (2016).
" Id.
"3 Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515.
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formula for how much explanation is enough. The sufficiency of the explanation
depends on the circumstances."3 3
With this background on the public interest, compelled speech, Red Lion,
content-based restrictions of speech, and the Administrative Procedure Act in mind,
the article next examines the reasons both for and against the FCC retaining is
three-hour, core-programming mandate.
II. THE THREE-HOUR, CORE-PROGRAMMING MANDATE:
EXAMINING ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ITS CONTINUATION
The year 2019 marks the fiftieth anniversary of when a now-shuttered group
called Action for Children's Television13 4 (ACT) set in motion the steps that
ultimately led to today's three-hour, core-programming rule for children's
television programming. " Indeed, former ACT leader Peggy Charren called
passage of the Children's Television Act of 1990 its "shining hour," and the group
dissolved soon thereafter in 1992.136
Today, however, the question is whether the three-hour rule should be
dissolved. That's because FCC Commissioner, Michael O'Rielly, largely teed up
the issue in a January 2018 blog post calling the rule-along with its related facets,
which he collectively refers to as Kid Vid mandates-"ineffective and
burdensome."" Although maintaining that "children's television programming,
both entertainment and educational, can be beneficial to a child's development,"38
the Republican commissioner's five key points for abolishing the rule are that it is:
* Unnecessary because children's programming today is available from a wide
variety of sources other than commercial television broadcasters. Alternative
sources, he contends, include cable networks like Disney Junior, Nick Jr.,
Nickelodeon, and Universal Kids and "popular over-the-top providers, such as
Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu, or subscription services, such as HBO, many of which
have specifically targeted children's programming as a way to gain market share
and consumer acceptance."1 39
133 Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1786
(2014).
'" The organization was founded by Peggy Charren in 1968 in Newton, Massachusetts, and
eventually ceased operating in 1992. Michelle Healy, Her Battle Won, Charren Signs Off USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 1992, at 4D.
1' See Dale Kunkel, Policy Battles Over Defining Children's Educational Television, ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., May 1998, at 39, 40 (noting that "[t]he origin of the debate about
requiring broadcasters to provide children's educational programming traces to 1969, when the
advocacy group Action for Children's Television first petitioned the FCC to mandate an hour a day of
such content from each broadcast licensee").
136 Watchdog Group for Children's TV to Disband, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A2 1.
1' O'Rielly, supra note 39.
138 Id.
13 Id
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* Ineffective because, since the 1996 rules were adopted: "[T]here is scant evidence
to indicate that children's programming on broadcast stations has improved. There
is also no scientific proof that the Kid Vid requirements specifically have led to
developmental benefits for children.""
* Harmful to minors because the requirement that core programs be at least thirty
minutes longl4 ' "killed any educational or informational programming of a shorter
timeframe that could benefit children viewers" such as "the 1970s ever-popular and
educational short animated skits under the umbrella of Schoolhouse Rock,
including 'I'm Just a Bill."'
1 4 2
* Harmful to adults because broadcasters must "face the tough choice of airing
programming that audiences want," such as "popular sports programming," or
adhere to "the stringent requirements of Kid Vid that the FCC has mandated" and
thereby deny adults content they want to watch.143
* Harmful to broadcasters because "displacing programming that viewers seek and
want for questionable Kid Vid programming depresses the value of broadcast
stations and threatens their financial resources to create and air costly
programming, like news and community specials, or pay the bills for other
programming, like network or syndication programs."'" In addition, "the reporting
requirements impose heavy burdens that force broadcasters to devote substantial
resources to paperwork, rather than local programming."145
In summary, O'Rielly asserted in his January 2018 post that the three-hour,
core-programming mandate and its related components are: 1) unnecessary; 2)
ineffective; and 3) harmful to a trio of stakeholders (minors, adults, and
broadcasters). After Chairman Pai appointed him the next month to head the
Commission's review of the rules, O'Rielly seemingly struck a more neutral,
open-minded tone. He issued a statement expressing his desire to study whether the
rules "still make sense in today's media marketplace and whether these rules
enhance or hamper the family broadcast experience."1" He also invited input from
'" Id.
'4' 47 C.F.R. 73.671(c)(4) (2018).
142 O'Rielly, supra note 39. The "I'm Just a Bill" segment of Schoolhouse Rock is available on
YouTube. Schoolhouse Rock!, I'm Just a Bill (Schoolhouse Rock!), YouTUBE (Sept. 1, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-tyeJ55o3E10 [https://permaccfZ9Z-BQWR]. For more
information about Schoolhouse Rock, see Erika Engstrom, Cartoons as Education, 23 J. POPULAR
FILM & TELEVISION 98, 98 (1995) (noting that Schoolhouse Rock "aired as programming inserts on
the ABC network from 1973 to 1985" on Saturday mornings and exposed children through animation
"to the images and lyrics of mini school lessons covering English grammar, American history and
civics, mathematics, and science" as told by "colonists, train engineers, and pieces of paper" that "sang
about freedom, the parts of speech, and the process of government").
1' O'Rielly, supra note 39.
'" Id.
145 Id.
'" Press Release, Michael O'Rielly, FCC Commissioner, supra note 38.
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entities likely to support retaining the rules, namely, "family group representatives
and evangelical organizations."'4 7
Yet even in his February 2018 statement, O'Rielly couldn't resist laying
the foundation for abolishing the rules as needless. Specifically, he asserted that
"since 1990, we have seen a proliferation of media platforms, including cable
networks, over the top providers, and premium channels, that, though not subject to
Kid Vid, offer competitive or vastly superior children's programming."" O'Rielly
failed, however, to cite evidence demonstrating why the content on such alternative
outlets is, as he claimed, "competitive or vastly superior"'4 9 to that carried by
over-the-air broadcasters.
Viewed cynically, appointing O'Rielly to lead a supposedly neutral review of
the rules just one month after he blasted them in his blog post is like letting the fox
guard the hen house. To wit, his January 2018 post articulated multiple reasons for
jettisoning the children's programming rules 150 and, in turn, for rebuffing a
challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act that such a policy change is
arbitrary and capricious.'5 ' In other words, he laid out-albeit without a supporting
factual predicate-what would seem to be the requisite "good reasons"152 and
"reasoned explanation"l53 for rebutting an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge. All
that is left, at least when perceived through a cynical prism, is to wait for public
comments to roll in and then fill in some blanks with supporting facts and data.
One facet of O'Rielly's January 2018 post, however, is especially
intriguing-his assertion that "[t]here is . . . no scientific proof that the Kid Vid
requirements specifically have led to developmental benefits for children."" Why
might the commissioner reference a supposed lack of scientific proof of benefits
stemming from a compelled-speech mandate?
One possibility is that O'Rielly is tapping into the Supreme Court's logic in its
2011 decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n.15 ' The Court in Brown
struck down a California statute that restricted minors' access to violent video
games, concluding the law could not pass muster under strict scrutiny.s15
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Brown majority, stressed that California
"cannot show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to
minors."1 7 He emphasized that "ambiguous proof [of harm] will not suffice" for
sustaining a speech regulation under strict scrutiny. "I Instead, evidence must
demonstrate that speech causes harm to justify its abridgement; a mere correlation
147 id
" Id.
149 Id
'" See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
"' See supra Section I.C. (addressing the Administrative Procedure Act).
IS2 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
153 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
'"O'Rielly, supra note 39.
'ss 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
' See id at 805 ("Legislation such as this, which is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict
scrutiny.").
'5 Id at 799 (emphasis added).
58 Id at 800.
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between speech and harm is insufficient. "' Additionally, Scalia asserted that
"curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution."'" This
constitutes "an extremely rigorous standard that demands both causation and
certitude.""6 '
In 2012-just one year after Brown-the Court reiterated in United
States v. Alvarez that "[t]here must be a direct causal link between the restriction
imposed and the injury to be prevented."6 2 Citing Brown, the Court in Alvarez
added that "[t]he First Amendment requires that the Government's chosen
restriction on the speech at issue be 'actually necessary' to achieve its interest."l
63
This "direct causal link" approach to strict scrutiny is "new within the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, having only entered the doctrinal lexicon
in Brown and Alvarez."164
If Commissioner O'Rielly's ultimate goal is eliminating the FCC's three-hour
children's programming rule, then asserting there is "no scientific proof"l
65 that it
benefits minors makes complete sense in light of Brown and Alvarez. The rule
simply is not-using terms from those cases-"actually necessary" because there is
no "direct causal link" demonstrating that the programs it requires improve minors'
educational and informational development. '" Thus, if this content-based rule
cannot survive a First Amendment challenge under strict scrutiny, then the FCC
surely should not enforce it. That, at least, may be the primary benefit of O'Rielly
alleging a dearth of scientific evidence.
It is a very clever argument. Whereas Brown and Alvarez require direct causal
proof of harm wrought by speech for the government to permissibly censor it,
O'Rielly stretches that logic to the realm of compelled speech. He believes-at
least, based on his statement noting a lack of scientific evidence about the benefits
of the core-programming mandate-that First Amendment jurisprudence similarly
demands direct causal proof of a benefit from speech for the government to compel
its publication. More bluntly, while Brown and Alvarez focus on direct causal proof
of harms, O'Rielly concentrates on direct causal proof of benefits. Without proof of
the latter, a compelled-speech regulation is impermissible, at least in O'Rielly's
apparent view. How this might unfold if the FCC, in fact, scraps the mandate and,
in turn, if there is an APA arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to that policy change,
159 See id. (noting that the social science studies cited by California "do not prove that violent video
games cause minors to act aggressively" and "show at best some correlation between exposure to
violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects").
i Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
161 Clay Calvert, Matthew D. Bunker & Kimberly Bissell, Social Science, Media Effects & The
Supreme Court: Is Communication Research Relevant After Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association?, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 293, 310 (2012).
162 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (emphasis added).
163 Id. (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. at 799).
'" Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, An "Actual Problem" in First Amendment Jurisprudence?
Examining the Immediate Impact of Brown's Proof-of-Causation Doctrine on Free Speech and Its
Compatibility with the Marketplace Theory, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 391, 404 (2013).
165 O'Rielly, supra note 39.
'6 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725; Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
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remains to be seen. What does seem clear, however, is an attempt to meld First
Amendment principles into potential APA challenges.
While O'Rielly made the case in his January 2018 blog post for abandoning the
three-hour programming rule, arguments exist for retaining it. Jeff Chester,
executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, 167 asserts the rule is
necessary because "[m]illions of kids in the U.S. live in homes that can't afford
cable or broadband." 1 6 The three-hour rule, in turn, "plays an important role
providing access to some quality content for these children."1 6 1
In other words, because some of the alternative platforms to which
Commissioner O'Rielly referred in his January 2018 blog post70 are not available
to all minors, broadcasters should continue to be compelled to air three hours of
children's programming each week. Broadcasters shoulder this duty, Chester
asserts, because they are supposed to serve as public trustees 17 and, without those
three hours, they will "reap the financial rewards without any real payback to the
public." 17 Put differently, airing three hours of children's programming is a
miniscule price for broadcasters to pay in exchange for licenses from which they
"earn billions of dollars." 73
United States Senator Edward Markey of Massachusetts echoes Chester's
sentiment about the need for retaining the three-hour rule for children who live in
households lacking Internet or cable service: "Families around our country,
particularly in low-income areas, rely on free, over-the-air children's programming
as a way to educate our [sic] their children."" He added that he has "serious
concerns about the changes contemplated by Commissioner O'Reilly and how they
would negatively impact kids coast-to-coast."'s
In brief, arguments for retaining the rule tap directly into both the obligations of
broadcasters to serve as public trustees and the fiscal realities that some families cannot
afford alternative avenues of media content.
' This organization, which was formerly known as Center for Media Education, describes itself as
"one of the leading consumer protection and privacy organizations in the United States" that "has been
at the forefront of research, public education, and advocacy protecting consumers in the digital age."
Annual Report Center for Digital Democracy 2017, CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY,
https://www.democraticmedia.org/annual-reports [https://perma.cc/W7KA-KLXR].
" Press Release, Jeff Chester, Center for Digital Democracy, Statement of Jeff Chester on
Plans by FCC to Review 3-hour Children's Educational TV Programming Rule (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.democraticmedia.org/article/statement-jeff-chester-plans-fcc-review-3-hour-
childrens-educational-tv-programming-rule [https://perma.cc/MX56-3NAY].
169 id.
17 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (referencing some of those alternatives).
"' See supra note 51 and accompanying text (addressing the public-trustee rationale for closely
regulating broadcasters).
72 Press Release, Jeff Chester, Center for Digital Democracy, supra note 168.
" John Eggerton, O'Rielly Takes Aim at Kid Vid Mandates, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan.
26, 2018), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/orielly-takes-aim-kid-vid-mandates-171392
[https://perma.cc/JY7Y-UC3Y].
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CONCLUSION
Peggy Charren's tireless efforts to improve television programming for
minors won her a coveted Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1995. 176 That was just one
year before the FCC adopted its three-hour children's programming mandate, thereby
adding flesh to the dictates of the Children's Television Act of 1990.177 Shortly after
Charren's death in 2015, US Senator Edward Markey called her "a conscience sitting
on the shoulder of every commercial broadcaster."
7
1
With that conscience now gone and a Republican-majority in charge at the FCC
under Ajit Pai, Charren's legacy may soon be swept away in the deregulatory fervor of
the moment.'79 If high-profile rules such as those affecting net neutrality can be
abandoned by the FCC,' then surely those unlikely to garner as much public attention
or generate as much outcry can also fall by the wayside. Much hinges, of course, on the
outcome of the O'Rielly-led review of the children's programming rules.
Might that outcome, however, already be a foregone conclusion? Might the rule's
death be, in the parlance of our times, a done deal? There's good reason, in fact, to
believe that is the case.
According to website TVNewsCheck, "a broadcast industry source close to the
issue believed that O'Rielly's [January 2018] blog" post slamming the three-hour rule
"had Pai's blessing."'"' As Tim Winter, president of the Parents Television Council
(PTC),18 2 bluntly put it:
[[I]t is deeply troubling that the Commission would first suggest an
intention to review the rules with a biog post proclaiming the rules to be
"burdensome," "ineffective," "unnecessary," "stringent" and other
conclusory wording that suggests the review is perfunctory and that the
outcome has already been decided. I am reminded of the old television
situation comedy Hogan's Heroes, one episode of which featured the
176 Matt Schudel, Longtime Advocate for Better Children's TV, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2015, at B4.
" See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (addressing adoption of the three-hour children's
programming mandate).
'" Bruce Weber, Peggy Charren, Children's TV Crusader, Is Dead at 86, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23,
2015, at B9.
' See Cecilia Kang et al., A Conservative TV Giant, Unleashed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2017, at Al
(asserting that since becoming FCC chairman in January 2017, "Pai has undertaken a deregulatory
blitz," and adding that "Pai's deregulatory drive has also helped win him a following as a champion of
pro-business, conservative causes--even leading some Republicans to approach him since he was first
named to the F.C.C. in 2012 about running for elected office").
o See Brian Fung, Net Neutrality Vote Is Official. Here's What Happens Now, WASH. PoST, Feb.
26, 2018, at Al0 (noting that in December 2017 "the FCC voted to repeal its net neutrality rules for
Internet providers-a move intended to deregulate the industry and allow companies such as AT&T and
Verizon to legally slow websites, block apps and even charge content companies extra fees for priority
access to consumers' screens").
'"' Doug Halonen, FCC Could Move to Ease Station Kids Rules, TV NEWS CHECK (Feb. 7, 2018,
7:46 AM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/111 016/fcc-could-move-to-ease-station-kids-rules
[https://perma.cc/TE9W-FZXD].
" The Parents Television Council's mission is "[t]o protect children and families from graphic sex,
violence and profanity in the media, because of their proven long-term harmful effects." The PTC
Mission, PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL, http://w2.parentsty.org/main/About/mission.aspx
[https://permacc/3YEE-AY9J].
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Gestapo major proclaiming that a prisoner "would be given a fair trial, after
which he will be shot."8 3
Yet the three-hour programming mandate is designed to help minors. Government
officials who target such a rule risk appearing cruel and callous toward children. Indeed,
Adrianne Furniss, executive director of the Benton Foundation, played this card when
she stated it was "unthinkable that the FCC would turn its back on children."'84
Proponents of maintaining the three-hour rule thus are framing'' the issue as one of
corporate greed versus childhood need. As Tim Winter contended, "[t]he reality, and
the sole reason why there is any conversation at all about Kid Vid rules, is that
broadcasters would prefer to make more money by running something else instead of
F/I [Educational/Informational] programming for children."l86 He added that "the FCC
should not and must not be in the business of increasing the value of broadcasting
companies."' Winter noted that the type of shows likely to replace children's content,
at least in the Los Angeles market on early morning weekends, would be "paid
programming that touts the removal of unwanted body hair, or the benefits of
membership in the automobile club, or a car wax that can undergo 50 car washes and
still bead water, or expert tips on buying and selling real estate with no money
down." "
In other words, the easy, feel-good vote at the Commission clearly would be for
retaining the three-hour, core-programming mandate. FCC commissioners who vote to
repeal it seemingly must have rhino-thick skins to withstand the verbal slings, arrows
and brickbats of critics. Those critics likely will paint and pummel the commissioners
as selling out the needs of innocent, poverty-ridden children whose parents cannot
afford the Internet or cable simply to feather the already bulging wallets of capitalistic
corporate broadcasters. That's a probable and brutal rhetorical reality of eliminating a
government-imposed obligation adopted more than two decades ago to benefit children.
Abolishing the FCC's three-hour children's programming rule thus will test the
fortitude of the Commission's three Republicans. Public sympathy for
children-especially for those whose parents cannot afford the numerous alternatives to
183 Tim Winter, Kid Vid: Will the FCC Throw the Baby Out with the Deregulatory Bathwater?,
PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL (Mar. 1, 2018), http://w2.parentstv.orgfblog/index.php/2018/03/01/kid-
vid-will-the-fcc-throw-the-baby-out-with-the-deregulatory-bathwater/ [https://perma-cc/8NBP-XK4L].
1" Eggerton, supra note 174.
.8s The concept of framing: "[Ilnvolves selecting a few aspects of a perceived reality and connecting
them together in a narrative that promotes a particular interpretation. Frames can perform up to four
functions: define problems, specify causes, convey moral assessments, and endorse remedies." Robert
M. Entman, Media Framing Biases and Political Power: Explaining Slant in News of Campaign 2008,
11 JOURNALISM 389, 391 (2010); see also Robert M. Entman, Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution
of Power, 57 J. CoMM. 163, 164 (2007) (defining framing "as the process of culling a few elements of
perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a
particular interpretation"); Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm, 43 J. Comm., Autumn 1993, at 51, 52 (asserting that "[t]o frame is to select some aspects ofa
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described" (emphasis in original)).
1 Winter, supra note 183.
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over-the-air broadcasting identified by O'Rielly in his January 2018 blog post-may be
the last wall of defense standing against the rule's deregulatory demise.
While minors may take center stage in efforts to save the children's programming
rules, their needs should not distract from the larger, macro-level question of whether
broadcasters should continue to be governed-or, more provocatively, be
burdened-by compelled-speech principles spawned nearly a half-century ago in Red
Lion. O'Rielly's blog post may seem uncaring and coldhearted to children's television
advocates, but the reality is that 2018 presents a much different media landscape in
which fewer people watch over-the-air broadcasting relative to fifty years ago."'
In fact, "youth are watching far less traditional TV than they used to." 190
Specifically, children ages twelve through seventeen years old watched eleven hours
and forty-seven minutes of traditional television per week during the first quarter of
2017."l That is a stunning 17.6 percent decline in one year and a whopping 45.5
percent drop since 2012. 192 As one 2017 report encapsulated it, "[w]hile overall
traditional TV has seen a drop in average viewership over the years, kids' TV viewing
is falling at a steeper rate."'93 Minors ages twelve through seventeen years "increasingly
transfer[] their media time from the TV screen to mobile devices on apps such as
Snapchat and Instagram."'
The bottom line is that FCC regulations should match the modern media
marketplace and media consumption trends. The three-hour obligation for core
children's programming is a relic from a very different era. It remains, in turn, propped
up by the compelled-speech logic and principles of Red Lion in 1969 that allowed
greater government incursion into the content of broadcasters relative to other media, all
in the name of the public interest. Given the FCC's current composition with a
Republican majority of commissioners, the death of the 1996 three-hour rule seems
inevitable. Without that rule, the Children's Television Act of 1990 will remain on the
United States Code books as a hollow vestige from the pre-Internet, pre-iPad,
pre-smartphone era.
"8 See Todd Spangler, Americans Are Watching Less Traditional TV as Smariphone Media Usage
Booms, VARIETY (June 27, 2016, 8:52 AM), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/Iive-tv-declining-
smartphone-boom-nielsen-1201804202 [https://permacc/T66D-HH791 (noting that "live television
viewing continues to decline as usage of smartphones and tablets to watch video and consume other
media skyrockets").
'" JC Lupis, The State of Traditional TV: Updated with Q2 2017 Data, MARKETING CHARTS (Dec.
13, 2017), https://www.marketingcharts.com/featured-24817 [https://perma.cc/RUF5-W2U6].
1" Id.
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'11 Wayne Friedman, Kids' TV Viewing Records Big Declines, MEDIAPOST (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/307400/kids-tv-viewing-records-big-declines.html
[https://perma.ccIEU7H-738K].
" Traditional TV's Demographic Woes Get Worse, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 4, 2017, 10:43 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/traditional-tvs-demographic-woes-get-worse-201 7-1
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